16 March 2009
National Security Analyst Discusses NATO at 60
CO.NX webchat transcript, March 16
National security analyst Anthony Cordesman, who holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, answered questions in a CO.NX webchat on March 16.
Following is the transcript:
(begin transcript)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Bureau of International Information Programs
Webchat Transcript
NATO at 60: Past, Present, Future
Guest: Anthony H. Cordesman
Date: March 16, 2009
Time: 09:00 EDT (13:00 GMT)
Anthony H. Cordesman: It is far easier to talk about the future of NATO in conceptual terms than to come to grips with hard realities. The Obama Administration faces a crisis in NATO/ISAF operations in Afghanistan where “post-conflict reconstruction” has turned into a major insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It faces a steadily intensifying war where NATO, at best, is dealing with a “stalemate,” and which in the real world, it is currently losing.
War, however, is only part of the challenge. The expansion of NATO into what Russia calls the “near abroad” has helped to provoke growing tensions between Russia, the US, and NATO. It has left growing questions about whether the expansion of NATO offers credible security to states like Georgia and the Ukraine, and how much the US can link its efforts to “reset” relations with Russia to its present policies in NATO. So far, comforting rhetoric has been mixed with Russian bomber flights near Britain and Russia threats to expand its military role in Cuba. The US “reset button” not only has been mislabeled, but it is also far from clear that it can even be pushed.
These same problems affect the future of US efforts to create a theater missile defense system in Europe, particularly one that goes beyond the deployment of advanced radars to the deployment of actual interceptor missiles. This not only affects NATO, but it affects Russian willingness to supply Iran with advanced weapons and material that may help Iran produce a nuclear weapon.
At the same time, Europe finds it faces a new potential threat in its dependence on Russian gas and oil that NATO is not designed to deal with, and for which Europe has no clear alternative. The good news is that the collapse of the global economy has weakened the Russian economy as much as that of Europe and the US. The bad news is that this may not make Russia a more reliable supplier, may pressure it to maximize revenues without investing in sustaining future supply, and lead to more “adventures” in an effort to distract its population and capitalize on Russian nationalism.
More generally, the economic crisis is putting more pressure on NATO defense budgets at a time when most European countries did not properly fund defense plans that already called for a steady erosion in force strength, modernization, and readiness. This decline has been somewhat disguised by a largely hollow debate on building up EU versus NATO military capabilities that has never been translated into truly credible military options in either the EU or NATO. “Institution building” has been largely decoupled from military reality. Moreover, the US is now facing problems in sustaining its defense efforts, and particularly the kind of advanced weapons programs that have given it a major edge in the “revolution” in military affairs.
Progress is being made in some areas. France has formally rejoined the military side of the alliance. NATO is learning what “out-of-area operations” really mean in Afghanistan. NATO also is also learning how challenging it can be to mix war-fighting with armed nation-building, and that the civilian side of “win, hold, and build” counterinsurgency efforts is as important as the military side. At best, however, the Obama Administration faces an extraordinarily challenging first term in which it will have to come to grips with the substance of NATO’s future, not simply conduct another exercise in political exhortation and rhetoric.
Question [Rodrigo]: The EU has been strengthening a common military policy in the last few years. Much has been asked about possible overlaps and points of cooperation. What does the future hold for the cooperation between NATO and the EU?
Answer [Anthony H. Cordesman]: There have been formal relationships between NATO and the EU since 2001, and the political principles for cooperation between them were agreed to in the NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP [European Security and Defense Policy] in December 2002. The North Atlantic Council sometimes meets with the Political and Security Committee of the European Union.
NATO and EU officials do meet on a regular basis and meetings take place at different levels including at the level of foreign ministers, ambassadors, military representatives and defense advisors. There are regular staff contacts between NATO’s International Staff and International Military Staff, and the European Union’s Council Secretariat and Military Staff as well as the European Defense Agency. The two organizations have also established permanent military liaison arrangements to facilitate cooperation at the operational level. A NATO Permanent Liaison Team has been operating at the EU Military Staff since November 2005 and an EU Cell was set up at SHAPE (NATO’s strategic command for operations in Mons, Belgium) in March 2006.
The creation of the European Defense Agency in 2004 has led to some substantive cooperation in areas like the Balkans, Afghanistan, counterterrorism and defense procurement, but far too much of the effort to cooperate in developing improved forces and war-fighting and peacemaking capability is more a matter of rhetoric than a credible effort to develop meaning national military plans and war-fighting capabilities.
At least part of the EU effort is also linked to goals to create a European force that would be so hollow that it could get European forces into a conflict or serious peacemaking effort without providing effective command structures, force levels, or sustainability. A NATO-EU Capability Group was established in May 2003 to “ensure the coherence and mutual reinforcement of NATO and EU capability development efforts.” It is intended to bring some level of coherence to initiatives such as creating EU Battle Groups, developed within the “Headline Goal” for 2010, and the NATO Response Force. In practice, however, neither effort seems truly effective, and coordination is still inadequate.
Q [jane M. O Sharp]: Would NATO be stronger as a bilateral alliance between USA and the European Union?
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: No. The EU has yet to demonstrate that it has the capability to develop real world defense planning capabilities and the full range of military command capabilities that are needed, and its focus is European economics and politics, not the broader range of Atlantic issues and out-of-area operations. NATO’s military committee and command headquarters at SHAPE and its Ministerial and civil effort at defense planning make it inherently more effective than Eurocentric bureaucracy. The EU also does not include the full range of members and potential members of NATO; only 21 of NATO’s 26 countries are members of the EU, and several possible candidate members of NATO would not currently fit into the structure of the EU.
As a result, the EU is focused on the EU and often more on European defense industry than on European security. If you want to understand the EU’s limits, take a long, hard look at the web site of the European Defense Agency. It describes some very real progress in limited areas, but the EU is not a military alliance and this is inevitably reflected in its real world activities.
Q [Jacee]: What are the ramifications of France coming back into the fold?
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: It will allow France to play a full role in NATO’s military command structure, take on senior positions in that command, and play a full role in NATO’s force planning, counterterrorism, intelligence and other functions. It is particularly important because France has some of NATO’s largest military forces and is a key producer of military equipment and technology.
Q [JP]: NATO North Atlantic...why NATO is involved in Afghanistan?
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: The Afghan conflict may have started with an attack on the US, but Al-Qa’ida has since made numerous attempts to attack European targets and jihadists have struck in Spain, Turkey and other European states. If Al-Qa’ida and the Taliban came to dominate Afghanistan, or create sanctuaries in Pakistan, this will greatly strengthen the jihadist threat to the entire Middle East, Europe, and the US.
Q [geopolitikos]: What about having NATO talking to IRAN?
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: NATO is not structured to carry out negotiations of this kind, and adding 26 countries to a dialogue that already includes Germany, the UK, and France, with the support of the US, would simply be a needless complication of an already difficult problem.
Q [Phil Her]: When will we see progress on NATO’s new Strategic Concept? Is there any prospect of pubic, academia or research institution critique of draft documents prior to NAC approval?
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: It really does not matter whether a document has NAC approval in terms of debate of its content and implementation. The debate goes on for years in any case, and strategic concepts are meaningful only to the extent member countries actually implement them. There will be ample opportunity to debate the concept, but it is far more important to debate and improve actual efforts to implement it.
Webchat Moderator (Kristin): Welcome to all our new guests! Mr. Cordesman is now taking your questions.
Q [RAJA ACHARYA]: I would like to know about the feasibility of extension of NATO in the Asian Region due to various Global changes in power equations and threat of terrorism.
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: With the exception of the US, no European power now maintains forces for sustained deployment in the Asian theater. Afghanistan already puts a massive strain on the power projection capabilities of NATO/ISAF powers. Britain and France could play a symbolic role, and other NATO countries could carry out very limited peace keeping missions, but this kind of out-of-area operation is simply not practical for most NATO forces.
Q [azmanov]: From Bulgarian News Agency (BTA) in Sofia: Could we have your opinion on the perspective of Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Monte Negro joining NATO? Problems and time frame?
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: At this point in time, NATO already is dealing with new candidate members, faces serious tensions with Russia, and needs to focus on creating a more effective approach to expansion. This does not rule out expansion to include such states, but NATO has higher priorities.
Q [D.Korda, HRT]: If the US, as the current discussions indicate, change in the future its strategy of unilateral response to world “hotspots” - will that lead to the greater role of the enhanced multinational NATO (RDF) forces? In that context, how can the issue of the equal burden sharing be solved with reluctant European allies? And how do you see, in that sense, the role of smaller NATO member-countries, as Croatia, that will soon join?
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: The Bush Administration may not have consulted as much with its allies as some other Administrations, but its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan were scarcely unilateral. NATO is deeply involved in Afghanistan and has long played a major role in training Iraqi security forces. A significant number of European members of NATO also supported the US in the invasion of Iraq and were members of the Coalition.
The broader question you raise, however, about rapid deployment forces, will ultimately be answered in terms of specific contingencies. European power projection capabilities vary radically be country and are very dependent on the specific area and type of fighting or peace making mission they face. They also are very unlikely to improve significantly, and there are strong indications that they may decline in some cases as a result of the pressure from the global economic crisis. As a result, there is no practical prospect of any meaningful form of “equal burden sharing,” and any actual deployments will be highly contingency-specific.
Q [ludin]: Mr. Cordesman, in the presence of NATO/American forces in Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency has increased dramatically in the past few years, while on the other hand the Afghan nation has put all of its trust on them, the majority still support NATO and US forces, don’t feel as they are invaders in the country, but we hear that most of the time US and most importantly NATO forces are talking about a possible failure. Don’t you think that think that the effect of such statements themselves can weaken the morale of the people and maybe the reason that most of the people are heading towards the Taliban, joined them instead of their elected government? Thank you very much.
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: Real world military operations can only be sustained through honesty and transparency, and part of the problem to date has been that NATO/ISAF has been so slow in honestly recognizing the growth of the threat, the limits and inadequacies of NATO/ISAF force contributions, and the need to demand more cooperation from the Afghan and Pakistani governments.
If one looks at recent developments, the average monthly number of major incidents in Afghanistan rose from only 50 in 2002 to 80 in 2003, 150 in 2005, 425 in 2006, and 566 in 2007. Suicide bombings rose from 1 in 2001 and 0 in 2002 to 2 in 2003, 6 in 2004, 21 in 2005, 123 in 2006, and 160 in 2007, and reached just over 1200 by the end of the first six months of 2008. The number of IEDs and roadside bombs rose from 22 in 2002 to 83 in 2003, 325 in 2004, 782 in 205, 1,931 in 2006, and 2,615 in 2007, although the number of effective IED attacks remained low.
The number of attacks in the peak month in each year rose from 400 in 2005 to 800 in 2006 and 1,000 in 2007, and reach 1,000 in September 2008. Attacks causing at least one death rose from 366 in 2005 to 695 in 2006 and 892 in 2007, and the number killed, injured, or kidnapped rose from 1540 in 2005 to 3,557 in 2006 and 4,672 in 2007. Peak monthly US casualties (killed and wounded) rose from less than 20 from 2002-2003 to the mid-30s in 2004, 70 in 2005 and 2006, and 130 in 2007.
These figures rose by roughly one third between 2007 and 2008, and the winter campaign seasons have been unexpectedly challenging because of favorable weather. As the NATO/ISAF figures attached to this analysis show, during 2008, there was a 33% increase in kinetic events or military clashes, a 27% increase in indirect fire attacks, and a 67% increase in surface-to-air fire. The number of IED attacks – the most serious source of casualties – rose by 26% to 27%. There was a 119% increase in the number of attacks on Government of Afghanistan personnel, and a 50% rise in kidnappings and assassinations. The number of suicide attacks dropped by 5%, but their lethality and skill increased and so did estimates of the number of suicide bombers in training. The number of NASTO/ISAF deaths rose by 35% and civilian deaths rose by 40-46%.
US and UN intelligence maps that were issued or leaked during 2005 to 2007, and more recent NATO/ISAF maps issued in January 2009, do show the size of the high risk-areas inside Afghanistan have increased by 30% to 50% every year since 2005.
These are not developments that can be ignored or covered up. NATO/ISAF needs to come firmly to grips with them and so do Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Q [Calin-Radu Ancuta]: Do you think that Greece will follow France in the military structures of NATO?
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: I’m a little at a loss as to the exact meaning of your question. Greece is a full member of the NATO military structure. If you mean will Greece follow the leadership of French officers, participation in any NATO operation is at the discretion of each member country. Greece will act in its own interest, and it will do so regardless of the nationality of given NATO commanders.
Webchat Moderator (Kristin): Welcome, new guests! Mr. Cordesman is answering your questions now.
Q [cranganu]: How do you see a NATO-originated missile defense system, especially aimed at the South/Eastern flank.
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: It is a good question and one that highlights the fact that any system must be tailored to the threats which actually emerge and then evolve in response to the extent that these threats actually increase. The problem with the present approach to missile defense is that it calls for the deployment of a limited number of interceptors to deal with an IRBM/MRBM threat that may arise in the future, but it does not deal with the shorter range threats that already exist to nations like Turkey. Hopefully, NATO, the US, and Europe will now focus on a threat-driven architecture for improved missile and air defense that meets the needs of the entire region, and where some form of dialogue with Russia can be more practical.
Q [Dan Mihai Neagu]: What is your view on NATO’s position toward The Ukraine and Georgia?
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: NATO cannot simply ignore states because they are have borders with Russia, but the fighting in Georgia illustrates the very severe limits to what NATO can and cannot do if Russia chooses to use military force in an area where NATO has limited operational military capability. NATO has probably done all in Georgia that it can do, and this does not offer Georgia a great deal of security. The Ukraine is a different case. It is a far more serious military power and is less divided and vulnerable, but the dangers in provoking a confrontation with Russia are obvious.
The answer may well be that NATO needs to put far more emphasis on diplomacy and its “partnership” with Russia, while slowly helping nations like the Ukraine improve their security and paying closer attention to creating more effective deterrents to pressures or threats to the Baltic states, Eastern Europe, and the other “forward” members of NATO.
Webchat Moderator (Kristin): Thank you for your patience. Mr. Cordesman is answering your questions as quickly as he can.
Webchat Moderator (Sarah): You can read a transcript of Vice President Biden’s recent comments at the NATO Press Conference in Brussels here: http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/March/20090310134444xjsnommis0.415661.html?CP.rss=true.
Q [ladybug]: Do you expect any major decisions at the NATO summit in the beginning of April in Straßburg and Kehl? If so, which?
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: Quite frankly, no. I think NATO will focus on existing membership issues, largely continue its current efforts in Afghanistan and the Balkans, and quietly begin to assess just how serious an impact the global financial crisis is having on its military programs.
Q [Calin-Radu Ancuta]: Do you think that North Korea is a threat? And what can be done?
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: North Korea remains a serious threat to South Korea, if only because of the instability of its regime and internal economy. More broadly, a nuclear armed North Korea with long range missiles would present a constant threat to its neighbors, if only because North Korea would seek to exploit the situation to pressure them and increase aid and other concessions. It is not, however, a NATO problem.
Q [D.Korda, HRT]: How do you see the pace of ANA training and when it can become significantly effective?
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: If you look at the Burke Chair part of the CSIS web site, at www.CSIS.org, you will find a detailed report on Afghan force development that will answer you question.
Q [Jan Zubina]: Mr. Cordesman, is it meaningful to build NATO anti-missile system originally intended to protect Europe and the US from Iran when Israel repeatedly announced she will not tolerate possession of nuclear weapons in Iran and there’s no reason to consider this as a plain threat?
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: It is far from clear that Israel will strike or that it could do more than delay Iranian efforts if it did. At the same time, it makes more sense to create an anti-missile and improved air defense architecture tailored to the actual threat than rush to deploy defenses before a threat clearly exists.
Q [Tomas A.Nagy]: The former Czech PM - Milos Zeman - has stated that, given by the fact that NATO´s main concern are the asymmetric threats, the alliance should seek further enlargement of countries that share both the values of NATO and this concern, i.e. Israel. How would you evaluate this opinion? Is the membership of Israel - provided it is finally able to achieve some kind of stable settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict- a possible alternative?
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: Unfortunately, there seems to be little practical prospect of a stable Israeli-Palestinian peace, and many members of NATO will not consider making Israel a member as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict continues.
Q [Phil Her]: What are current prospects of deepening NATO relationships with Australia, Japan and others who share security interests outside the NATO member geography?
A [Anthony H. Cordesman]: Aside from dialogue, almost none. The US is a global power. Aside from very limited British and French naval and air capabilities, no European power is equipped to play this role.
Webchat Moderator (Kristin): We are reaching the end of our time with Mr. Cordesman. As you can imagine, his schedule is rather tight. Please check our page in 2 days (http://co-nx.state.gov) for a transcript of this discussion.
Thank you all for your excellent questions. Feel free to share your thoughts on this chat and suggest topics for further discussion on our Facebook page - http://co-nx.state.gov
Webchat Moderator (Sarah): Thank you all for coming.
Q [ladybug]: In your opinion, how will the relations between NATO und Russia continue to develop?
Anthony H. Cordesman: Let me close this session with this answer. The Obama Administration has already said that it is seeking to “reset” relations with Russia. The practical question, however, is whether Russia wants to improve relations with NATO and the US, or whether it is seeking to reassert its power and status and influence over the “near abroad.” At present, the latter motive seems to drive Putin’s behavior and a resurgent Russian nationalism. This does not mean a new Cold War, or bloc progress where it is clear that it is in Russia’s interest to cooperate -- as it may be in some aspects of arms control. It may well, however, mean a long period of tension with sustained Russian pressure on key border states, a lack of cooperation in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and showy Russian demonstrations like resuming bomber flights near Britain.
Webchat Moderator (Sarah): The webchat is now closed. We wish to thank Mr. Anthony H. Cordesman for joining us today. A transcript of today’s webchat will be posted to http://co-nx.state.gov and to http://www.america.gov/multimedia/askamerica.html within two business days. Speakers are chosen for their expertise and may not reflect the views of the U.S. Department of State.
(end transcript)
