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16 January 2004
U.S. Official Examines Relief Strategies at Cuba Transition Conference
Says humanitarian response in Cuba will be shaped by many factors
Because Cuban dictator Fidel Castro has repressed his people for more than four decades, "it is with great care that we should prepare for Cuba's [eventual] transition to democracy," says Andrew Natsios, administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
Speaking January 16 at the Cuba Transition Conference in Washington, Natsios warned that experience has often shown that "the pent-up expectations and frustrations of a long-oppressed people can sometimes boil over" in dangerous ways. "No one is more aware of this than President Bush," Natsios added.
The president recognizes that "the transition to freedom will present many challenges to the Cuban people and to America," but he is determined that "we will be prepared" for those challenges, Natsios said. For this reason, the USAID administrator explained, the United States must take three things into account: the factors that will shape U.S. humanitarian relief early in a Cuban transition, the strategies that should guide U.S. efforts, and the importance of basing U.S. relief efforts on accurate assessments of local conditions.
"How the transition in Cuba proceeds will profoundly affect the nature of our humanitarian response," Natsios pointed out. Barring the emergence of a new post-Castro leader with no interest in democracy, he said, three different scenarios are possible in Cuba.
The first -- and most desirable -- outcome would be the arrival of a stable democratic transitional government "with broad popular support, no disruptive opposition from the old order and no violence or unrest," Natsios observed. A second alternative would be the emergence of an unstable democratic transition government that nevertheless "weathers the storm while maintaining the ability to schedule elections and transfer power to a democratically elected government," he said. And the third possibility is the emergence of an unstable democratic government "which dissolves into a failed state, due to widespread violence from a national military divided into factions supporting various elements of the old regime," Natsios told his audience. "Under this scenario, we would expect widespread human rights abuses to occur and the political system and economy to collapse."
That third scenario "is what we refer to as a complex humanitarian emergency," he said. "If Cuba's transition turns into a complex humanitarian emergency, few humanitarian organizations may be willing to work there," because conditions would be deemed too hazardous. Yet "on the other hand," if a relatively successful democratic transition government "has already held free and fair elections, then the relief efforts should plan to support the new cabinet ministries in visible ways, such as we did in Panama in the early 1990s," Natsios argued.
He cited "two essential imperatives" that are "at the heart of all humanitarian relief strategies" -- saving lives and reducing human suffering. Natsios recommended "the strengthening of traditional coping mechanisms in the population," rather than an over-reliance on importing humanitarian relief commodities such as food and medicine. "While donated commodities can supplement this effort, it is the immediate rehabilitation programs that yield the most positive results and encourage self-sufficiency," he said. "Plans that are poorly designed can sometimes exacerbate problems."
Although "we cannot know for certain what Cuba's needs will be until a thorough humanitarian assessment is completed," Natsios said, "a good assessment will calculate Cuba's food supplies, the nutritional status of children, shelter, agricultural production, water, sanitation," medical equipment and supplies, "and the macroeconomic situation. From that would come a series of specific programs and recommendations."
Natsios concluded his remarks by offering a number of suggestions for the U.S. government and the international community to consider during a transition to democracy in Cuba, and applauded the many "excellent speakers" at the January 16 conference who are contributing their own ideas. He noted that "many of these ideas will be published" and will help shape the recommendations that Secretary of State Colin Powell presents to the president on May 1, 2004, "on behalf of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba."
He emphasized that USAID "shares completely" the Bush administration's commitment to facilitate a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. "We do not know when freedom will finally come for the Cuban people," Natsios reflected. "But we do know that day will come. And when it does, 'we will be prepared,' just as President Bush has said."
Following is the text of Natsios' remarks, as prepared for delivery:
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Andrew S. Natsios
Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development
Remarks at Cuban Transition Conference
January 16, 2004
Thank you, Adolfo.
The Cuban dictator has held the Cuban people in political bondage for more than four decades. So it is with great care that we should prepare for Cuba's transition to democracy. For as we know from experience, the pent-up expectations and frustrations of a long-oppressed people can sometimes boil over and lead to "serious evil."
No one is more aware of this than President Bush. As the president said when he established the Commission for the Assistance to a Free Cuba in October, it is time "to plan for the happy day when Castro's regime is no more and democracy comes to the island."
"The transition to freedom will present many challenges to the Cuban people and to America," he said. "And we will be prepared."
So it is my great pleasure to welcome you all here today, as we begin the process of preparing for a successful -- and peaceful -- transition to a democratic Cuba.
I would like to talk about three things today:
-- the factors that will shape U.S. humanitarian relief early in a Cuban transition;
-- the strategies that should guide our efforts; and
-- the importance of basing our relief efforts on accurate assessments of local conditions.
As the leading bilateral humanitarian relief agency in the world, USAID's first concern in any transition is to ensure people's basic needs are met and to minimize human suffering. Our resources are not unlimited, however, and the robustness of our humanitarian response will be driven by three factors:
-- the severity of the crisis, as measured by child and maternal mortality rates;
-- national security interests; and
-- American public support for a generous response.
In the case of Cuba, the transition is not likely to be as severe as, say, North Korea where two and a half million people starved to death during the late 1990s. Still, we cannot be certain of the conditions the Cuban people will face.
As Jasper Becker points out in his analysis of the famine during China's "Great Leap Forward," totalitarian regimes are particularly effective in hiding widespread suffering from outsiders. I saw this for myself in North Korea during the 1990s, first with World Vision and then when I was researching my book, The Great North Korean Famine.
As for the other two factors -- national interest and public support -- Cuba ranks very high. Given the island's proximity to the United States, there is a high risk of a rapid and chaotic out-migration from Cuba in the aftermath of Fidel Castro's departure. A very real possibility exists, therefore, that a failed Cuban transition could lead to a complex humanitarian emergency. Clearly, that would be a very serious concern for the United States.
How the transition in Cuba proceeds will profoundly affect the nature of our humanitarian response. Of course, there is always the possibility that a new Cuban leader with no interest whatsoever in democracy will emerge from within the current system. I am sure that is what Castro is hoping will happen.
If that can be prevented, there are several scenarios which may unfold:
-- One: a stable democratic transition government takes over with broad public support, no disruptive opposition from the old order and no violence or unrest;
-- Two: an unstable democratic transition government takes over and is shaken by internal divisions, sporadic violence and disruption from renegade military units or disaffected party cadres. But it weathers the storm while maintaining the ability to schedule elections and transfer power to a democratically elected government;
-- Three: an unstable democratic government takes over which dissolves into a failed state due to widespread violence from a national military divided into factions supporting various elements of the old regime. Under this scenario, we would expect widespread human rights abuses to occur and the political system and economy to collapse.
This third scenario is what we refer to as a complex humanitarian emergency. This is where a democratic transition unravels into chaos, leading to a food and health crisis or an economic crisis or both. Imagine, for example, what the collapse of Cuba's tourist industry might mean.
If Cuba's transition turns into a complex humanitarian emergency, few humanitarian organizations may be willing to work there. And more resources will have to be devoted to keeping people alive, rather than rehabilitation and reconstruction.
In a true complex humanitarian emergency, supplies -- such as food aid, medicine, computers, trucks and other equipment -- become targets for various armed factions to steal and use for their own purposes. So not only is there a likelihood that donated supplies will be stolen, but a very real threat that relief workers will become subject to violence and intimidation. Under these conditions it is nearly impossible for humanitarian relief agencies to avoid being drawn into political battles.
On the other hand, if the democratic transition government has already held free and fair elections, then the relief efforts should plan to support the new cabinet ministries in visible ways, such as we did in Panama in the early 1990s.
Humanitarian Aid Strategy
At the heart of all humanitarian relief strategies are two essential imperatives: saving lives and reducing human suffering. This should not be done primarily through the importing of humanitarian relief commodities, such as food and medicine, but through the strengthening of traditional coping mechanisms in the population. While donated commodities can supplement this effort, it is the immediate rehabilitation programs that yield the most productive results and encourage self-sufficiency.
Secondary objectives may be added to the mission. Yet it is essential that they not compromise the primary mission of saving lives and reducing suffering. It is important to remember that the more chaotic conditions become, the more you can expect the law of unintended consequences to take hold. Plans that are poorly designed can sometimes exacerbate problems.
That said, there are several secondary objectives that should be considered in Cuba's case, provided, of course, they do not compromise the first mission. Among these are:
-- Discouraging internal population movements during a transition through media broadcasts and the rapid establishment of humanitarian aid efforts in rural areas and small towns in order to reduce the incentive to move to the cities. The reason is this: people on the move during an emergency are at much greater risk from violence, communicable disease, and acute malnutrition than they would be if they stayed at home.
-- Supporting a democratic transition through the relief effort itself, as we have done in Afghanistan, by having relief organizations work closely with the transition government, so that the public credits the new government with the improvement in conditions.
-- Encouraging the building of civil society and democratic pluralism by having relief organizations work with emerging local institutions or churches to administer the relief. This joint work should be designed to build local capacity in running programs.
-- Designing relief programs so that they help prepare society for long-term development. This is called the relief-to-development continuum. For example, food-for-work programs have been very effective in helping revitalize Afghanistan's agricultural sector.
Humanitarian Assessment and Program Design
Of course, we cannot know for certain what Cuba's needs will be until a thorough humanitarian assessment is completed. Given the highly politicized nature of Castro's government, I would not want to rely on the statistics they produce. The best people to do these humanitarian assessments are from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance -- OFDA. While the U.N. or Red Cross could do them, too, political pressures could distort their assessment in Cuba's case.
A good assessment will calculate Cuba's food supplies, the nutritional status of children, shelter, agricultural production, water, sanitation, medical and the microeconomic situation. From that would come a series of specific programs and recommendations. Accepting media accounts or reports from non-technical people is simply a shortcut to disaster.
Given Cuba's long nightmare with Marxist economics, the microeconomic study will be of particular importance. That is where we can look for the causes of malnutrition or starvation, the relationship of family income to food prices, the vitality of local markets and the impediments to the development of more efficient markets.
Cuban Coping Mechanisms
The Cuban people have made use of four traditional coping mechanisms to survive the double disasters of Marxist economics and the loss of Soviet subsidies: remittances from relatives abroad; a return to the countryside to grow food; receiving humanitarian aid; and tourism. The problem is that the majority of the population lacks access to them.
I would like to conclude now with some recommendations for the U.S. government and the international community to consider during a transition:
-- Efforts should continue to encourage Cuban-American charities to become members of InterAction -- the NGO trade association -- and to register with USAID. This way they can learn InterAction governance and programming standards and USAID grant-making processes. I know that the Cuban Democracy Support Group, Miami Medical Team, the Cuban Council and other Cuban-American NGOs have registered with us, but it is important that others do as well.
-- We should begin developing four tracking systems: nutritional surveys of children under age five; morbidity and mortality tracking; food market surveys of prices; and household surveys of family food stocks. Data from these surveys will be crucial for predicting crises, determining whether aid programs reach the needy, and targeting the aid.
-- If the food security system deteriorates, children will be at particular risk. So we should develop a plan for immunization program for all children under five. Although Cuba reportedly has a high rate of childhood immunizations, the quality of those immunizations may well be weak, as has been the case with many other nations that formerly made up the Soviet bloc.
-- Once a transition has begun, the interim government should commission NGOs to manage large-scale public works projects, using day labor or food-for-work or cash-for-work programs. The success of these programs can be an important deterrent for young men who might otherwise turn to crime or join paramilitary militias.
-- Similarly, every effort should be made to keep all public schools open, both to help in emergency food relief and to keep young people off the streets and occupied.
-- A plan should be considered to support household gardens.
-- And finally, if food prices exceed the ability of ordinary families to pay, a careful food monetization program should be introduced to maintain prices at affordable levels.
We have a number of excellent speakers today, and I am sure that you will hear many useful suggestions from them during this conference. Many of these ideas will be published and help shape the recommendations that Secretary Powell makes to the president on May 1st on behalf of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba.
The secretary, of course, has no illusions about Fidel Castro and the nature of his regime. But he is a man who understands the Cuban people and the yearning for change, for freedom and democracy, that animates so many.
As he has written, "There are courageous individuals in Cuba who are working daily and heroically against great repression to bring about the institutions and practices of a civil society. The United States will do all it can to encourage them and to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba."
That is a commitment USAID shares completely. So I want to thank you all for being here today and for keeping the hope of a free Cuba alive. We do not know when freedom will finally come for the Cuban people. But we do know that day will come. And when it does, "we will be prepared," just as President Bush has said.
Thank you.
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(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
