30 April 2008

State Department Report on Terrorism in the Western Hemisphere

Release of Country Reports on Terrorism for 2007

 

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE OVERVIEW

 

“With persistence and transparency, Colombia will overcome terrorism, which is financed by illicit drugs…To fight them (terrorists), we deepen democracy instead of restricting it, protect liberties instead of suppressing them, stimulate dissent instead of silencing it. Our fight against terrorism is observed by national and international critics, who can be in the country and say what they please without any restriction. Our democratic practice gives us the political authority to say that those who take up arms, financed by illicit drugs, are not insurgents against oppression but terrorists against liberty.”
       
Mr. Alvaro Uribe Velez, President of Colombia
       Statement, 62nd UN General Assembly, New York;
       September 27, 2007

Regionally based Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) in Colombia, and remnants of radical leftist Andean groups were the primary perpetrators of terrorist acts in the Western Hemisphere. With the exception of the United States and Canada, where some prosecutions of suspected terrorists were underway, there were no known operational cells of Islamic terrorists in the hemisphere, although pockets of ideological sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean lent financial and moral support to terrorist groups in the Middle East.

In May 2007, Venezuela was re-certified as "not cooperating fully" with U.S. antiterrorism efforts under Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as amended. Rampant corruption with the Venezuelan government and military, ideological ties with the FARC, and lax counternarcotics policies have fueled a permissive operating environment for drug traffickers and an increase in drug trafficking to Europe, Africa, and the United States.  Cuba remained a state sponsor of terrorism.

On November 9, 2006, an Argentine judge issued arrest warrants for eight current and former Iranian government officials and one member of Hizballah for their alleged role in the July 18, 1994 terrorist bombing of the Argentine-Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) that killed 85 and injured over 150 people. On March 13, 2007, INTERPOL's Executive Committee unanimously decided to issue international “wanted” notices (“Red Notices") for five of the Iranians (including the former Minister of Intelligence and Security, Ali Fallahijan, and the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Qods force) and the one Lebanese national (Imad Mugniyah, recently deceased). The Government of Iran appealed that decision. On November 7, INTERPOL's General Assembly voted (78 for, 14 against, 26 abstentions) to uphold the Executive Committee's March 13 decision and the “Red Notices” were issued.

The threat of a transnational terrorist attack remained low for most countries in the hemisphere.  Overall, governments took modest steps to improve their counterterrorism capabilities and tighten border security, but corruption, weak government institutions, ineffective or lack of interagency cooperation, weak or non-existent legislation, and reluctance to allocate sufficient resources limited progress. Some countries, like Argentina, Panama, Paraguay, Mexico, and El Salvador, made serious prevention and preparedness efforts. Others lacked urgency and resolve to address deficiencies in their counterterrorism posture. Caribbean and Central American nations, recognizing their vulnerability to attack or transit by terrorists, took steps to improve their border controls and to secure key infrastructure, especially air and maritime ports. The CARICOM nations have an on-going relationship with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for the review of passengers traveling in the region which enables the United States to screen passengers against the terrorist screening database and review them for other suspected travel patterns. Most countries began to look seriously at possible connections between transnational criminal organizations and terrorist organizations. Colombia maintained and strengthened its “democratic security” strategy, directly confronting the convergence of threats from terrorism, newly emerging criminal groups, narcotics trafficking organizations, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The Colombian government was increasingly successful in attacking mid-level FARC commanders engaged in narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities. The September 3 and October 25 deaths of commanders Tomas Medina Caracas “El Negro Acacio,” and Gustavo Rueda Diaz, “Martin Caballero,” respectively, represented serious blows.

In May, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation uncovered a plot by two Guyanese, one Trinidadian, and one U.S. citizen to destroy a fuel pipeline at New York's JFK airport. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago cooperated in the effort to locate and detain those involved in the plot. Of the four suspects, three were arrested in Trinidad, where they remained in custody awaiting a judicial decision on their extradition to the United States. The fourth suspect remained in detention in the United States.

The United States enjoyed solid cooperation on terror-related matters from most hemispheric partners, especially at the operational level, and maintained excellent intelligence, law enforcement, and legal assistance relations with most countries. The hemisphere boasts the OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, which is the only permanent regional multilateral organization focused exclusively on counterterrorism.

Mexico and Canada were key partners in the War on Terror and U.S. homeland security.  Cooperation with them was broad and deep, involving all levels of government and virtually all agencies, in several initiatives. Recognizing the threat from terrorist transit, the Mexican government worked with the United States to enhance aviation, border, maritime, and transportation security, to secure critical infrastructure, and to combat terrorism financing. United States- Canadian counterterrorism cooperation took place in a number of established forums, including the terrorism subgroup of the Cross Border Crime Forum, the Shared Border Accord Coordinating Committee, and the Bilateral Consultative Group (BCG). The BCG brings together USG and Canadian counterterrorism officials from over a dozen agencies, on an annual basis, to coordinate policy on bioterrorism, information sharing, and joint counterterrorism training. Both Canada and Mexico have arrangements with the United States for the exchange of terrorist screening information, pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) No. 6.

The United States remained fully committed to supporting the Government of Colombia in its efforts to defeat Colombian-based Foreign Terrorist Organizations. President Alvaro Uribe continued vigorous law enforcement, intelligence, military, and economic measures against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and remaining elements of the former United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) who have not demobilized or who have gravitated to newly-formed criminal groups. The Colombian government also increased its efforts with neighboring countries to thwart terrorist expansion, investigate terrorist activities inside and outside Colombia, seize assets, secure hostage release, and bring terrorists to justice. Colombia provided antiterrorism training to nations in the region.

Colombia's neighbors had varied reactions to the threat from Colombian based terrorists. While none condemned the terrorists or designated the groups for domestic purposes, they responded for the most part, positively to Colombian requests to arrest specific fugitives. Brazil and Peru improved cross-border cooperation with Colombia, which was often instituted at the local rather than national level. Ecuador demonstrated a willingness to militarily confront encroaching foreign narcoterrorists, while security forces in Brazil and Peru generally sought to avoid military confrontations with them. Forces in Peru pursued reemerging domestic terrorist groups aggressively. It remained unclear to what extent the Government of Venezuela provided support to Colombian terrorists. However, weapons and ammunition, some from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities, have turned up in the hands of Colombian terrorist organizations. Neither the Venezuelan nor Colombian governments systematically policed the 1400-mile Venezuelan-Colombian border to prevent the movement of groups of armed men or to interdict arms flows to narcoterrorists.

(The full text of the terrorism report is available on the State Department Web site.)

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(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

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