25 January 2007

State's Frazer Outlines U.S. Policy Priorities for Somalia

"Somalis are ready for peace," Assistant Secretary Frazer says

Following are excerpts of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer's remarks at a January 17 seminar on Somalia sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies:

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[U.S. Department of State]
Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, January 17, 2007

Excerpts of Remarks by Assistant Secretary Jendayi E. Frazer at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

“Securing Somalia’s Future: Options for Diplomacy, Assistance, & Security Engagement”

For the first time in at least a dozen years, we have been presented with a real opportunity to rebuild Somalia and restore effective governance representative of all aspects of Somali society.

We have all been preparing for that moment that offers a glimmer of hope.  It has arrived, and we should seize it.

This moment might not have come about by exact design or in the way that we had hoped and intended, our response can and will be purposeful.

During my recent trip, I met with President Yusuf, Prime Minister Ghedi, Parliament Speaker Shariff Hassan, and representatives of Somali civil society.

If there is one lesson I took away it is this: Somalis are ready for peace; they are tired of war.

While the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) are not yet ready to stand entirely on their own, they offer a promising vehicle forward for Somalia.

There are three primary U.S. policy priorities for Somalia.  First, mobilize international support to help build the governance capacity of the TFIs.  Next, move forward with the deployment of an African stabilization force in Somalia.  And third, encourage inclusive political dialogue between the TFIs and other key Somali stakeholders based on the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter.

The January fifth meeting of the International Somalia Contact Group on Somalia that demonstrated the international community’s commitment to supporting a sustainable political solution in Somalia through broad-based national dialogue and providing development, security, and humanitarian assistance.

The Contact Group emphasized the urgent need for funding to facilitate the deployment of a stabilization force in Somalia, based on Resolution 1725, which will provide a secure environment in which a political process can move forward and effective security institutions can be developed.

The Contact Group recognized that the Somali people must be responsible for maintaining local-level security.  This requires the development of a civilian police force, as well as an effective, unified national army representative of all of Somalia’s clans.

Most important is the path to peace, reconciliation, and stability.  To a great extent, this process will rely on the government’s willingness to reach out and create an inclusive political process.  This objective remains our greatest challenge.

To be clear, the United States has supported a process of inclusive dialogue since the then-Union of Islamic Courts defeated the warlords in Mogadishu in June 2006.

The United States supported the Khartoum process and the 7 points of the June 22 Khartoum Declaration, including the points of mutual recognition and cessation of hostilities.

Unfortunately, extremist elements within the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) – particularly the radical al Shabaab organization – hijacked the broader movement, driving the CIC towards an agenda of military expansion and aggression.

Despite international efforts to encourage dialogue between the CIC and the TFIs, the CIC chose to repeatedly violate the terms of the Khartoum Declaration through the takeover of Kismaayo, the attack on the Parliament building, and military build-ups around Baidoa and Puntland.

The CIC repeatedly attempted to provoke Ethiopia into a broader conflict, beginning with the probe towards Baidoa on July 19, and again from November through December.

These were decisive moments.  Ultimately, the CIC miscalculated in its decision to pursue a military agenda and refuse to join the governance process and the TFIs through peaceful dialogue.

When Ethiopia launched a counter-offensive against the CIC in December, the CIC structure disappeared faster than anyone had anticipated, driven in large part by the withdrawal of support from the Somali population.

Hopefully, we have all learned from these developments, including the leadership of the TFG.

The United States believes that the key to long-term stability in Somalia now lies in a process of inclusive dialogue and reconciliation.  The leaders of the TFG must serve as symbols of this process.

The statement that President Yusuf made to the Contact Group was a positive step, but the statements of the TFG leadership must be matched by positive actions inside Somalia that demonstrate their commitment to an inclusive process of dialogue and reconciliation.

We have been clear – we see a role in the future of Somalia for all those who renounce violence and extremism, and we strongly believe that the TFG must reach out to groups that have previously been marginalized from the TFG and the political process.

The TFG must reach out to key groups inside Somalia, including: clan leaders, business and civil society, women’s groups, and religious leaders, among others.  These groups, particularly those in Mogadishu, must also demonstrate their willingness to engage with the TFG and to work together constructively.

While we do not believe that the CIC should be reconstituted as a political entity, the TFG should also reach out to the diverse range of local, organic courts affiliated with various clans, as well as moderate individuals who could be brought into the larger, official political process.

This dialogue must move forward very quickly to reach a sustainable solution, on the basis of the TFG Charter, in order to stabilize the situation in Mogadishu and allow all components of the TFIs to relocate to the country’s capital.

To clarify, we do not see this as an either-or proposition.  The security and political components of the policy I have just described are more likely to function as two simultaneous efforts, progressing toward the same end point.

Work remains to be done, if the political process is going to be inclusive, comprehensive, and successful.  We are cognizant of the challenges we face – possibly including a lack of political will from some elements of the TFG to engage in such a process.

However, we understand that this is an ongoing process, and that we have not reached the end.  Along with our African and international partners, the United States will remain engaged in supporting this process of inclusive dialogue, while also responding to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people.

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(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)